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NOTES
Antitrust-Tying Arrangements-A Re-examination of the Per Se
Rule and Identification of Tying Arrangements
It is axiomatic to antitrust law that "tying arrangements serve hardly
any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."' Despite the apparent simplicity of this statement, the problems confronted in identifying tying arrangements and in establishing standards for measuring
anticompetitiveness, once a tie-in has been identified, have confounded
the courts2 and antitrust authorities.'
Tying arrangements generally have involved a situation in which
a single seller markets two separateproducts (or services) together, with

one, the tying item, acting as a lever in the selling of the other, the tied
product." As other forms of economic leverage, tying arrangements
have been treated by the courts as inherently anticompetitive5 because
I Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). For a

succinct introduction to the law of tying arrangements, see E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 47-58 (1964).
2
Identification of tying arrangement: Compare Carvel Corp., TRADE REG. REP.
17,298 (FTC 1965) (defendant's franchise agreements not regarded as tying arrangements because the trademark license could not constitute a "tying product")
with Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964) (trademark license could
conceptually constitute a "tying product"). See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (advertising sold by defendant for both
morning and evening newspapers only a "single product" and, therefore, no
tying arrangement found), and compare, Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp.,
340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1965) (AP's Ohio regional wire circuit held separate and
distinct from other AP circuits and AP's argument that the "news" was the only
product involved in the agreement rejected).
Suppression of competition: Compare Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) with Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1

(1958).
Identification of tying arrangement: Compare Turner, The Validity of Tying
Arrangements under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50, 62-64 (1958) with
Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20-29
(1957).
Suppression of competition: Compare Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique
and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 88, 96-126 with Day, Exclusive
Dealing, Tying and Reciprocity-A Reappraisal, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 539, 539-54

(1968).

'Austin, supra note 3, at 89. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 5 (1958); cf. Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
'See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
Despite the condemnation of tying arrangements, it is clear that they are not always anticompetitive in nature. See Bowman, supra note 3, at 25-29.
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the seller's use of economic power in an extraneous market to bring
about sales in another market, in which his power may be slight, introduces an artificial element into the competition in that other market.
Buyers, who may want to purchase only the tying product from the seller,
are forced to purchase, as a package, items that they might rather obtain
separately. 6 Thus, they must forego their free choice between competing
products. Competitors of the seller in the tied market are faced with an
anomalous situation in which they are forced to compete on a basis entirely divorced from the quality or price of the goods that they offer." Because of their smaller size, they may be in no position to offer the similar
package; or if they are able to offer the same package, doing so may
divert their efforts at improving their single product.
Obviously, the successful tying arrangement has deleterious effects
on competition. Thus, the Supreme Court has promulgated a per se
rule8 for determining if a tying arrangement has sufficient impact on
competition to bring the seller within the sanctions of sections one' and
two"0 of the Sherman Act, section three1 1 of the Clayton Act, or section
five' 2 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. At least with respect to
actions under the Sherman or FTC Acts,'" that rule has been stated as
follows: "They [tying arrangements] are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the

tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for
the tied product and a "not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce
' See Austin, supra note 3, at 99.
See Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REv.
626, 627-38 (1965).
8 Actually, the "per se rule" might more accurately be described as "per se rules";
historically the "rule" has involved different elements depending upon whether the
Sherman or Clayton Act was the basis of the action. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953). See also Mattson, Condition that the Lessee or PurchaserShall Not Deal in the Goods of a Competitor,
in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 181-88 (1958).
°26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §2 (1958).
1138 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §15 (1952).
1238 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §45 (1958).
"6Section 1 of the Sherman Act is subsumed by section 5 of the FTC Act
(prohibition of unfair methods of competition). See Austin, supra note 3, at 89;
Turner, supra note 3, at 58 n.33. Thus, for purposes of the material examined in
this note, it may be assumed that reference to application of the Sherman Act
also includes application of the FTC Act, section 5. In fact, there is some authority
for the proposition that section 5 is broader in application than section 1, under a
"quasi-tying" theory (see Day, supra note 3; at 555-56) or under an "incipiency"
doctrine (see Note, Use of Section 5 of the FTC Act to Reach "Incipient" Violations of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 77, 79-88 (1967)).
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is affected."' 4 As is often the case with a doctrinal approach, however,
establishing this qualified per se rule has done little to alleviate the problems encountered by the Court in dealing with tying arrangements. A
recent case, Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,"5
emphasizes the difficulty that courts have in identifying tying arrangements and applying the per se rule. Consequently, the decision also serves
to point out the deficiencies in the established doctrine and, thereby, to
redirect inquiry into the actual economic problems in the tie-in area.
Fortnerinvolved an action by a private party seeking treble damages
and an injunction for violations of sections one and two of the Sherman
Act.'" The plaintiff, Fortner Enterprises, alleged that the defendant,
U. S. Steel, had instigated an illegal tying arrangement whereby the defendant through its wholly owned credit corporation, U. S. Steel Homes
Credit Corporation, required the plaintiff to purchase unreasonably highpriced prefabricated houses, manufactured by the defendant, as a prerequisite for obtaining low-cost, one-hundred-per-cent financing for the
purchase and development of land.' The agreement required the plaintiff
to erect one of the prefabricated houses on each of the lots purchased with
the proceeds of the loan."
The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant, 9
and held that although the agreement was a tying arrangement, the
plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to establish the prerequisites for
application of the per se rule, "namely sufficient market power over the
tying product [credit] and foreclosure of a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product [houses]."" The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed without opinion." The Supreme Court on
certiorari 22 reversed and remanded the action for trial on the merits.
Justice Black spoke for the five member majority; Justices White and
Fortas wrote separate dissents. The Court held that "the conduct challenged .. .involves a tying arrangement of the traditional kind" 23 and

that the plaintiff had made sufficient allegations to go to trial on the issue
" Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (emphasis added),
citing International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
15394 U.S. 495 (1969).
1 Id. at 496.
'"Id.at 497.
IsId.
Is See id.
20 Id. at 497-98.
"Id. at 498.
"393 U.S. 820 (1968).
"11394 U.S. at 498.
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of unlawful suppression of competition under both the general standards
of the Sherman Act2" and the per se rule.25
The district court and a majority of the Supreme Court were in
agreement that the defendant's conduct could be identified as a tying
arrangement. The dissenters, however, were by no means convinced.
Justice Fortas, in particular, based his dissent on his conviction that there
was no tying arrangement involved in the case.
Whether the credit and houses constituted two separate products
was Justice Fortas' chief concern."' In any action allegedly concerning
a tie-in, the court's determination of what constitutes the lawful commercial package has the practical effect of molding competition.2 7 For
example, if the Court in Fortnerhad established, as Justice Fortas suggested, that the credit and homes were a single unit, U. S. Steel's competitors, in order to compete, would either have had to produce a similar
package or else manipulate the sale of homes in such a manner as to entice buyers out of the market for the combined credit-homes package.2 8
Without examining the possible effects of a single-product determination, Justice Fortas concluded that the agreement in question was
"... a sale of a single product with the incidental provision of financing.
It [was] not a sale of one product on condition that the buyer . . .
[would] buy the other product exclusively from the seller."2 He argued
that the facts did not support the conclusion of the majority that the
financing was for the purchase and development of land. Rather, he felt
that "[t]he financing [was] solely and entirely ancillary to [the defendant's] sale of houses." 30 His dissent also emphasized the economic
2I!d. at 500.
r Id. at 500-01.
" The problem of the "single seller" could have arisen in Fortner since U.S.
Steel and the credit corporation were separate legal entities, but the Court had held
in previous cases that such a subterfuge was not a defense. See Leitch Mfg.
Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. of America v. American
Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); cf. Perma Life Mufflers v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). Obviously, if the Court were to allow a seller to
incorporate subsidiaries to avoid the consequences of imposing a tie-in, the result
would be tantamount to repealing all legal prohibitions against tying arrangements.
In fact, Justice Black used the separateness of the defendants as an argument for
finding separate products. See 314 U.S. at 507.
"'See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), afgd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
"See Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REV.
626, 627 (1965) ; Turner, supra note 3, at 62-64.
394 U.S. at 522 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
2

" Id.; see Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th

Cir. 1962) (developing the concept of the reasonably ancillary restriction on a
license as a valid method of protecting trademark rights). See also Carvel Corp.,
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factors81 that might have been involved in the case and questioned
whether there would be any opportunity for the defendant at trial to
32
present justification for the arrangement.
Justice White alluded to the issue of identification of the tying arrangement when he characterized the majority's logic as "dictat[ing]
the same result if unusually attractive credit terms had been offered simply for the purchase of the houses themselves." ' One possible argument
is that allegedly separate products, if sold in fixed proportions, are in
fact often economically interdependent and, thus, merely portions of the
same product. 4 Justice Black, however, made clear that he could not
view the defendant's arrangement as a single product:
Sales such as [those generally made on credit] are a far cry from
the arrangement involved here, where the credit is provided by one
corporation on condition that a product be purchased from a separate
corporation, and where the borrower contracts to obtain a large sum
of money over and above that needed to pay the seller for the physical
products purchased. Whatever the standards for determining exactly
when a transaction involves only a "single product," we cannot see how
an arrangement such as that present in this case could ever be said
to involve only a single product.3 5
The importance of a finding that an alleged tying arrangement involves only a single product is obvious under the doctrinal approach;
conceptually there can be no way for a product effectively to act as a
"lever" for the sale of itself. More precisely, the per se rule rests upon
the premise that tie-ins involve an extension of power into a new or second market rather than merely an expansion of power within a market
in which the defendant already holds sway.3 In reality, however, the
REi'. 17,298 (FTC 1965); cf. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505
(2d Cir. 1964).
-1394 U.S. 523-25 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
' 2 Id. at 523-24 n. (Fortas, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 511 (White, J., dissenting). It is possible so narrowly to state the holding in Fortner that it would have meaning only when credit was offered for the
financing of land with houses tied thereto. So stated, this holding would add
nothing to the law of tying arrangements enunciated in Northern Pacific; and
U.S. Steel could avoid the holding simply by giving low-cost, one-hundred-per-cent
financing on the homes and not the land. However, as Justice White suggests, the
majority opinion does seem to apply to credit, regardless of its form, so long as it
is used
in an anti-competitive manner.
8
See Bowman, supra note 3, at 25-27; Turner, supra,note 3, at 67-72.
394 U.S. at 507 (footnote omitted).
"Bowman, supra,note 3, at 19-20. Professor Bowman suggests that "leverage"
is an ambiguous term that should be restricted to cases involving extension of
TRADE REG.
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cases are replete with examples of conduct that the courts readily could define as involving either a single product or two separate ones.37 Particularly in those cases involving determination of the appropriate unit of sale for
a given product are the courts faced with definitional alternatives.88 In
other cases, a court may have to determine whether a particular item
may be deemed so ancillary to the alleged tying product as to form a
part of a single product.8 9 Thus, the courts are often faced with a
dilemma; and doctrines, definitions, and rules provide little, if any, aid.
If a defendant can offer some economic justification for his alleged
unlawful conduct, it is advantageous for him to offer it in his argument
on the issue of tie-in identification. 40 This approach may provide courts
the opportunity to recognize the defendant's policy argument and to apply a balancing test to the rights of the buyer, seller, and the seller's
competitors without entering the linguistic maze of the per se rule.
Justifications that may prove palatable to the courts include the following: economies in production and marketing of the total package ;41
the need to maintain the "good will' established for the primary product ;"'
price competition within a "hard" market for the tied product ;48 techpower into a new or second market. See Day, supra note 3, at 539-41. Professor
Day distinguishes between tying arrangements and exclusive dealing on the "second market" basis.
"See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
"See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953);
See also Burstein, A Theory of Fudl-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1960).
'9

See cases cited note 30 supra.

Despite the fact that the majority had no trouble labelling the tying arrangement in Fortner,the identification issue presents an opportunity for the defendant
to offer justification, unlike the conclusory procedure involved in application of the
per se rule. Cf. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545
(E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-ins, Franchises, Territorials, and Excusives, 18
STAN. L. Rsv. 457 (1966).
"' See Bowman, supra note 3, at 29; Turner, supra note 3, at 66-67. Of course
there is the concomitant requirement that the economies in cost result in a lower
price for the package. See Pearson, supra note 28, at 627. See Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
"' Compare International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131
(1936) with FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923). See S. OPPENREIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 600-01 (3d ed. 1968). But see

Austin, supra note 3, at 123.
"'See 394 U.S. at 519 (White, J., dissenting). A "hard" market exists when

there are only a few sellers in the market, all of whom are powerful, and there
is great resistance to price competition among them. (E.g., a price cut by any one
of the sellers will be matched by the others.) In such a market, competion must
take other forms in order to be effective. The "hard" market consideration should
have been particularly relevant in Fortner since there is a likelihood of an oligopolistic market in prefabricated steel houses. Thus, if U.S. Steel's only competitors
were the few other giants of the steel industry, it is probable that the credit offered
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nological interdependence of the products

;44

custom and usage within the

markets of both products;45 patterns of consumer demand;46 and, of

primary importance, the availability and feasibility of similar techniques
for the seller's competitors in the tied market.'
The second major issue in Fortner, the application of the per se
4
rule " under the facts (i.e., the examination of the anticompetitive effect
of the defendant's conduct, given its identification as a tying arrangement), was the focal point of both the majority opinion and Justice
White's dissent. The doctrines established by the Court in prior cases49
placed two conditions on the application of the per se rule in "nonpatent,
Sherman Act" ' cases: sufficient economic power of the seller in the
tying product's market and a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce
affected in the tied market. These two conditions had been set forth as
a means of testing the impact of a tying arrangement on competition.
Without any impact on the tied market, the tying arrangement could
hardly be called anticompetitive because it would be obvious that buyers
were not foregoing their freedom of choice among products and competitors were not losing a substantial market. These conditions amount
to a cause and effect test of impact: the defendant's power in the tyingproduct market representing the cause and the amount of commerce affected in the tied-product market indicating the effect.
It is arguable after Fortner,as indeed it was arguable after Northern
PacificRailway v. United States"-and United States v. Loew's, Inc.,52 that
the Court has done away with the requirement of "sufficient economic
power." Justice Black's opinion provides language to support almost any
by U.S. Steel was competition and in no way prejudicial to its competitors with
equally "deep pockets." It seems almost incredible that none of the opinions in
Fortnerposed the question of who constituted defendant's competition in the housing market.
"Bowman, supra note 3, at 27-29.
"Pearson, supra note 28, at 627-31.
'Id. at 631, interpreting Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 235 F. Supp.
751 (E.D. Ky. 1962), aff'd, 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
954 (1965).
"This issue actually forms the basis for inquiry in the tying-arrangements
area. See Pearson, supra note 28, at 627-31. For an examination of "justifications" in general, see Note, Blsiness Justification for Tying Agreements: A Retreat from the Per Se Doctrine, 17 W. RESERv L. REv. 257 (1965).
48 See Turner, supra note 3, at 64-75, for an examination of the positive attributes of a per se rule and an explication of when it should apply.
,See Times-Picayune Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
80 See Turner, supra note 3, at 50-55.
01356 U.S. 1 (1958). See Day, supra note 3, at 545.
82371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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conclusion on the issue. What is still clear after Fortner is that the defendant need not dominate the tying market.5" The effect that the "distinctiveness" or "uniqueness" of the tying product has on the issue of
the defendant's power is very unclear. Justice Black quoted with approval
the dictum from the Loew's case: "[T]he crucial economic power may
be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from
uniqueness in its attributes."5' 4 However, later in his opinion, Black
offered the following remark: "We do not mean to accept petitioner's
apparent argument that market power can be inferred simply because
the kind of financing terms offered by a lending company are 'unique and
He attempted to resolve this apparent contradiction by esunusual.' ,
tablishing different classifications of "uniqueness." 55
Despite the battle of words in the opinion, one clear principle emerges:
when the seller establishes an appreciable number of tying arrangements,
"sufficient economic power" in the tying product is conclusively presumed.57 Obviously this principle is based on the number of buyers that
a defendant can attract; thus, it is apparent that Justice Black has decreased the possibility for large corporate defendants to avoid the consequences of the per se rule once a tying arrangement has been found.
Similarly, the principle enunciated by Fortner on the issue of the
amount of commerce necessary for application of the per se rule effectively prejudices large defendants attempting to tie products. What
amounts to "not insubstantial" is determined by looking at the total dollar value of the tied products for all similar tying arrangements that
the defendant has initiated, regardless of whether the action may be (as
in Fortner) a private one between the seller and only one buyer. This
statement of the "quantitative substantiality" test is quite similar to that
previously followed by the Court."8 However, Fortner alters the traditional test in two important ways. First, it dilutes the requirement for
a substantial dollar amount by implying that a figure of two hundred thousand dollars (less than half the amount found to be "not insubstantial" in
394 U.S. at 502-03.
" Id. at 503. The confusion arising on the role of "distinctiveness" is probably
due to language derived from cases involving a patented tying product. See Turner,
supra note 3, at 50-55.
'

394 U.S. at 505.

TM

Id. at 505 n.2.
" See 394 U.S. at 504. See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958) (sufficient economic power shown by the "host" of tying agreements the
defendant had entered).
"' See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 3.56 U.S. 1 (1958). See also
Day, supra note 3, at 540-43.
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International Salt Co. v. United States,5 9 which had originated the
per se doctrine in 1947) would be enough 0 and by explicitly holding
that an individual plaintiff in a treble-damages action can lump together
all the values of tied products for all arrangements similar to his own."'
Second, Fortner removes any consideration, in the majority of cases, 2
of the percentage of the "relevant market" for the tied product:
The requirement that a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce be
involved makes no reference to the scope of any particular market
or to the share of that market foreclosed by the tie ....

[N]ormally

the controlling consideration is simply whether a total amount of business, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be
merely "de minimis," is foreclosed to competitors by the tie ....63
Thus, given a reduction in dollar-volume requirement and an expansion
of market considerations, one inevitable result of Fortner would seem
to be an increase in the size of the class of potential defendants in tie-in
cases, with the large nationwide corporation being the most susceptible
to suit. Perhaps the Court was heeding the words of Justice Cardozo
that ".

.

. size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be

ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in the
past."64
The significance of Fortner with respect to the per se rule is obviously quite great. It serves to abolish almost completely the distinctions in application of the Clayton and Sherman Acts to tying arrangement cases."5 The "missing link" in cases under the Clayton Act had
been that the tie-ins of "services" were not subject to the proscriptions of
section three while tie-ins of "products" were.6 6 This fact would almost
G 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (five hundred thousand dollars in contracts a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce).
GO
394 U.S. at 502 (dictum).
01 Id.
02 Id. at 501 ("relevant market" may be important in cases involving a small
dollar volume of commerce if the defendant's sales represented a large percentage
of the market).
" Id. This holding may have been derived from Northern Pacific, see Day,
supra note 3, at 544-45. However, the validity of that precedent had become questionable, see Austin, supra note 3, at 88-95, commenting on the Atlantic Refining

cases: Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309 (1961).
"United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932) (dictum).
"See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09
(1953). See also Turner, supra note 3, at 50-55.

GOMattson, Condition that the Lessee or PurchaserShall Not Deal in the Goods
of a Competitor, in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 181-88 (1958).
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undoubtedly have forced a different result in Fortner if the action had
been brought under section three.6 7 Since there is no economic distinction between goods and services, experts have universally condemned the
artificial distinction in the application of the per se rule, established by
Times-Picayune Publis-hing Co. v. United States," for actions involving

products under the Clayton Act and those involving services, necessarily under the Sherman Act.69 The distinction resulted in the anomalous
situation wherein actions against the tie-ins of services placed a heavier
burden of proof on the plaintiff than that required for actions against
tie-ins of products.
Fortner also makes clear the presumption against large sellers in
tying arrangement cases. It now seems doubtful that these sellers will
be able to offer any justification for their action sufficient to prevent
application of the per se rule once the tying arrangement has been identified.70 This conclusion is emphasized by the fact that both the "power"
and "amount of commerce" requirements are, after Fortner, quantitatatively measured. The "number of buyers" test for power and the "dollar volume" test for amount of commerce may best be viewed as twin
corollaries of a rule that completely forecloses the tie-in as a marketing
technique for large sellers regardless of its competitive effect.
After examining the majority's careful explication of doctrine in
Fortner, one might seriously ask (as, indeed, Justice White's dissent
seems to ask in part)71 the following question: Although there are now
standards established on all fronts, how do these standards relate to

",See United States v. Investors Diversified Serv., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn.
1951) ("credit" not a "commodity" under the Clayton Act). See 52 CoLum. L.
Rv.1066 (1952).
" 345 U.S. 594 (1953). The Court established the following distinction for application of the per se rule under the Clayton and Sherman Acts:
When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the
"tying" product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the "tied" product is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because from either factor the requisite
potential lessening of competition is inferred. And because for even a lawful
monopolist it is "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any
substantial market," a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of the Sherman
Act whenever both conditions are met.
Id. at 608-09.
"oSee, e.g., Turner, supra note 3, at 58.
" Cf. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-ins, Franchises,Territorials, and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. REv.
457 (1966); Note, Business Justification for Tying Agreements: A Retreat from
the Per Se Doctrine, 17 W. RESERvE L. REV. 257 (1965).
71394

U.S. at 514-18 (White, J., dissenting).
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anticompetitiveness, and what is the actual policy and factual basis for
finding the defendant's conduct unlawful? The most blatant answer to
this question is that once the standards are fulfilled, anticompetitiveness.
exists. Obviously, this is an answer based on the sheer power of the
courts and made without any conscious attempt to balance interests; but
it helps to underscore the conclusory nature of the per se rule as applied
72
in Fortner.
The answer that the Court would undoubtedly give is that these standards act as unerring indicia of the foreclosure of a substantial amount
of business to the defendant's competitors in the tied product and that
this foreclosure, at the hands of large business, is usually founded
on anticompetitive design. justice Black might also add that, even if
there be no anticompetitive design and although there exists justification for the arrangement, this method of competition is so inherently destructive of competition by other, usually smaller, businesses in the tied
market that the Court is justified in making the defendant find another
method of competition. 73 However, the very problem with this approach
is that a seller may well find another method of competition-one that
will not be given the label of "tying arrangement" but that will bring
about the same effects. 4
It is suggested that the courts may best be able to effectuate the
policies of the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts in the area of tying
arrangements by consciously examining and balancing the interests involved: those of the seller, the buyer, and the seller's competitors. The
seller may have many motives for conduct similar to that in Fortner,
some of which may not be anticompetitive in design or practice. justice
White suggested a number of salutary interests that the defendant in
Fortner may have had: the conduct may have been merely price competition in a different form, effected by a reduction in the economic price
of the credit rather than of the houses; the defendant may have been
competing in a "hard" market in which there was great practical resistance to price competition; or the defendant may have been expanding
the scope of the market by bringing in buyers who would otherwise be
unable to purchase the prefabricated homes at any price.75 In addition
' See Austin, supra note 3, at 123.
'3

Id. at 122-26.

RocKEFELLER, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATIOx To1967, at 78 (1967), suggesting that the Standard Oil case, 337 U.S. 293

" See J. ScoTT & E.
DAY:

(1949), had only resulted in the refiner buying retail locations and then leasing

them to retail dealers who were still required to use only the refiner's gasoline.
75 394 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
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to interests previously examined in relation to identification of tying arrangements, sellers may evince other lawful reasons for their action. 76
Some, such as business expediency and similar methods used by others
77
in the defendant's situation, are not likely to be accepted by the courts.
Others, particularly the interest of a newcomer to an established market,
who is using the tie-in to break into the market,7 and the interests of
those sellers who are within a nascent, technical market requiring them
to have particular expertise, 79 may prove to have some significance outside personal interest and may thus warrant some type of protection.
Despite the fact that the majority in Fortner took pains to show how
the interests of the plaintiff-buyer were damaged by the tying arrangement, it seems that, on the whole, the plaintiff was actually benefitted
to the extent that he was unable to receive any credit from any source
outside the defendant.80 Of course, the interests of the buyer are not unimportant; those interests-having a free choice of sellers and products
and obtaining quality goods and services at optimum prices-are actually
the public-policy bases for maintaining competition. 8 ' The problem with
examining the buyer's interest is that it may be, as in Fortner,so elusive
that it merely compounds the difficulties involved in the balancing process.
The most important interest in tying arrangement cases is that of
the seller's competitors.8 2 The progenitor of the present per se rule
made clear this bias, for in InternationalSalt the Court stated that "[i]t
is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market."8 3 In Fortner Justice Black suggested that the defendant's competitors in the market for prefabricated homes might find it not only
economically but also legally impossible to provide buyers credit terms
similar to those offered by the defendant.8 4 This factual decision should
Materials cited note 70 supra.

See Austin, supra note 3, at 122.
But see Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-ins, Franchises,
Territorials,and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. Rnv. 457, 473' (1966).
" Id. See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See also Austin, supra note 3,
at 122 (suggesting that a combination of interests may weigh heavily on a
court's decision).
80394 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
"1See Austin, supra note 3, at 99.
8
See Pearson, supra note 28, at 627-38. Cf. Signode Steel Strapping Co. v.
FTC, 132 F.2d 48, 53 (4th Cir. 1942).
U.International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
8,394 U.S. at 505-06 nn.2 & 3. Justice Black suggested that credit agencies
may be precluded by law from giving one-hundred-per-cent credit in the Fortner
situation. He added that this type of competitive pre-emption would invariably
be unlawful.
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logically have formed the basis of the Court's decision. Thus, had Justice Black not chosen to embark on a tortuous linguistic search for
"power," he might well have found the answer to the foreclosure issue
by asking three simple questions: Did the defendant's questionable conduct result in any sales within the prefabricated home market? If so, were
there enough of these sales to make the defendant's competitors in that
market seek to establish a similar mode of conduct? Finally, was that
mode of conduct unavailable to these competitors? An affirmative answer
to these questions would establish foreclosure; if the defendant were unable to provide some overriding justification, the balance could be logically struck against him, and his conduct declared unlawful.
KENNETH B. Hipp

Attorney and Client-Dealing with Clients' Property-the ABA
Revision of Canon Eleven
Historically, the attorney-client relationship has been one of delicate
trust, as observed by Justice Nelson in 1850:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher
trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or, generally
speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more
anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by sterner principles of
morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them
in a corresponding spirit ....1
A recent Iowa case, Nadler v. Treptow,2 illustrates the ethical questions arising when an attorney becomes interested in his client's property.
Attorney Nadler represented Elease Treptow in, among other matters, a
contract for the purchase of real property from the estate of one Pappas.
Financial difficulties prevented Mrs. Treptow's meeting her three-hundreddollar-per-month contractual obligation to the estate. Because the "problem was complicated,"' 3 Nadler was able to purchase from the Pappas
estate at an eight-hundred-dollar reduction the interest that his client
had sought. At least one complication of which the court spoke was the
prior contract with Mrs. Treptow. Through it, presumably, Nadler
learned of the factors that caused the reduction in price: The attorneyclient relationship became one of debtor-creditor/contract vendor.4 Nadler
Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850).
'Iowa -, 166 N.W.2d 103 (1969).
Id. at , 166 N.W.2d at 108 (dissenting opinion).

'Id.

